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Employer-provided health insurance covers the
majority of Americans under the age of 65. A beneficial
aspect of employers providing health insurance is that
the group to be insured is selected by a criterion other
than the demand for health insurance. Hence, the
problem of adverse selection is sidestepped. Recently,
however, the disadvantages of the link between
employment and health insurance, especially those
pertaining to the labor market, have received a great
deal of attention in academic and policy circles.
One problem with this system of employer-provided
health insurance is that the strong link between
employment and the provision of health insurance
implies that if wages do not pedectly offset differences
in the valuation of health insurance across jobs,
individuals may not change jobs even when new jobs
with higher match specific productivity are available.
This phenomenon, called "job lock," may result in a
welfare loss.
Another problem lies in the small-group market
(typically, firms employing less than 25 persons) for
health insurance, where the problem of adverse
selection remains despite the lillie between employment
and health insurance. Almost 60 percent of non-elderly
adults without health insurance are employed. Nearly
two-thirds of uninsured working adults are employed in
small firms.
Small firms that provide health insurance to their
employees struggle to find and keep affordable health
insurance, because a single expensive illness or
accident may lead to health insurance cancellations or
prohibitive price increases. The impact of the small
group health insurance market on small firm behavior is
an area of much speculation but little research.
Despite the academic and policy interest in these
problems with the system of employer-provided health
insurance, the extent of the problems and the effect of
the policy measures have not been fully established.
The literature on job lock has reached no consensus on
the importance of portability on job mobility. There is
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little to no research examining how small firms are
affected by aspects of the small group health insurance
market. Furthermore, there is little research that
evaluates the impact of recently enacted state-level
health insurance legislation. This dissertation
addresses this gap between policy and research.
The first chapter of this dissertation uses the
National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES) of 1987
to measure the importance of job lock. The economics
literature has not reached a consensus on the severity of
job lock. Studies using the NMES have found that job
lock is responsible for a 25-30 percent reduction in job
mobility-a large and significant effect. Other
evidence, from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
and the Survey of Income and Program Participation,
shows that job lock has an insignificant effect on job
mobility for man-ied men. However, these estimates
are imprecise; hence, they are unable to reject the
presence of large levels of job lock suggested by the
studies using the NMES. This conflicting evidence
from different data sources and empirical
methodologies is puzzling for both researchers and
policymakers. I use the NMES, which has yielded
precise estimates of job lock, to answer the question "Is
the conflicting eviden~e on job lock for married men a
result of differences in the data or in the
methodology?"
Ideally, to estimate job lock using the quasiexperimental difference-in-difference technique, the
identification of job lock should be based on good
proxies for family sickness and a relatively comparable
job-locked experimental and non-locked control
groups. The difference-in-difference estimator relies
on the similarity of the experimental and control
groups in order to identify the effect of interest from
other exogenous influences. In most of the earlier work
estimating job lock, insured persons form the
experimental group and the uninsured form the control
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group. However, the uninsured differ from the insured
in terms of base levels of mobility and demographic
and job characteristics; hence it is unlikely that the
effect of exogenous influences on the insured group is
equal to the effect of these influences on the uninsured
group. The use of these groups to estimate job lock
may yield inconsistent estimates.
I refine the difference-in-difference technique by
creating more-comparable control and experimental
groups and good proxies for family sickness. Job lock
should be greater for workers who are sick or have sick
family members because they are likely to face preexisting condition exclusions if they change jobs. In
addition, they are more likely to find factors such as
waiting periods for coverage on a new job and lack of
insurance during job search to be burdensome. I use
previously unexploited, detailed data on medical
conditions, health utilization, and medical expenses to
proxy for sickness. To estimate find two groups which
are comparable, one of which can be hypothesized to
be more severely affected by job lock than the other, I
tum to spousal health insurance. Individuals who have
access to spousal health insurance (that is, their spouse
holds employer-provided health insurance) in addition
to their own employment-related health insurance are
possibly already covered by their spouse's policy or
may succeed in getting on a spouse's policy with loose
rules, even if they do suffer from some pre-existing
conditions. Therefore, individuals who have their own
employer-provided health insurance but no spouse
health insurance and have adverse family health
conditions are the most likely to be job-locked.
Using this refined difference-in-difference approach,
I find insignificant estimates of job lock, and the
confidence intervals of these estimates exclude large
levels of job lock. I find that the estimates of job lock
have the wrong sign and are insignificant.
Furthermore, the estimates are precise enough to
exclude large levels of job lock from their confidence
intervals. While these estimates are consistent with
those from studies using the SIPP and the PSJD, they
are far smaller than the estimates using the NMES. To
resolve this, Ire-analyzed Madrian's 1994 finding of
significant job lock using family size and pregnancy of
spouse as job lock measures in the NMES. After
correcting methodological problems and using better
data to construct the job lock variables, job lock is
insignificantly different from zero.
While, on the whole, job lock does not have a
significant impact on job mobility, it may effect certain
subgroups of working individuals more than others. I
examine this proposition in the second chapter of the
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dissertation. Since large firms tend to have generous
health insurance policies with limited pre-existing
condition clauses, job lock may not be a significant
concern for individuals considering a move to a large
firm. However, for individuals consideling a move to a
small firm, strict pre-existing condition clauses may be
a significant deterrent to mobility. Furthermore, if
small-firm policies are less generous than large-firm
policies, non-portability would be more of a deterrent
to job transitions to small firms for individuals who
were employed in large firms (as opposed to those
employed in small firms). Since most job transitions
are from large firms to large firms, the overall measure
of job lock discussed above may mask these impOltant
differences in transitions. Using the NMES, I estimate
the magnitude of job lock for individual considering a
move to a small firm and find that small-firm job lock is
important for individuals with medical conditions that
would lead to the denial of coverage by small-group
insurers. This finding suggests that legislation aimed at
reducing the problems with the small-firm market may
reduce job lock.
In the third chapter, I examine how the small-group
health insurance market influences small-firm
employment. The difficulties faced by small firms in
obtaining health insurance for their employees have
been widely documented. Only about one-third of
firms with fewer than SO employees, and one-quarter of
finns with fewer than 10 employees, offer health
insurance as a fringe benefit. The small firms that do
provide health insurance to their employees are in a
precarious position. Insurance companies, wary of the
possibility of adverse selection, calculate premiums on
a yearly basis as the expected value of health care
utilization. Hence, a single high-cost incident during
the year could lead to a substantial surcharge on the
premiums for all members in the finn. Alternatively,
the insurance company could refuse to write a policy
for the high-risk individuals in the group, and in
extreme cases could refuse to insure the entire group.
Small firms could respond to the inadequacy and
unpredictability of their potential group health
insurance policies by maintaining a work force that has
a low expected utilization of health care services.
Assuming that firms are unable to perfectly tailor
individual wages to health insurance costs, small firms
may screen out employees with high expected health
costs in order to keep premium variability in check.
There has been little previous empirical work that
uses detailed health data to examine such employment
screening. Using the NMES data, I construct health
measures based on the Office of Technological
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Assessment's 1988 classification of 45 common
medical conditions into three categories according to
the underwriting behavior of individual and smallgroup insurance companies. Medical conditions are
classified as those leading to outright denial of
coverage, those leading to exclusion restrictions, and
those leading to higher premiums.
I find small firms that offer health insurance are
more likely to screen out workers with families that
have conditions that lead to higher premiums. These
workers are 65 percent less likely to be hired in small
firms with insurance and 30 percent more likely to be
laid off from small firms with insurance relative to large
firms with insurance. Howcver, small firms are no
more likely than large firms to screen out workers who
have families with conditions leading to denial of
coverage or cxclusion restrictions, since these
conditions do not add to their medical claims. These
results suggest that the link bctween small-firm hcalth
insurance and employment may lead to employment
distortions and inefficiency. Therefore, small-group
health insurance reform that reduces pre-existing
condition limitations and regulates the pricing of small
firm policies may be warranted.

In the last chapter, I study the impact of state smallgroup health insurance reforms on job mobility and
employment outcomes, focusing on three types of
reforms aimed to ensure the following. First, small
firms that want health insurance coverage are accepted
and renewed by insurers. Second, when an individual
changes jobs, waiting periods for coverage and preexisting condition exclusions are short or non-existent.
Third, premiums arc based on only certain allowable
rating factors (such as age or family size and not on
factors such as health status) and premium rate
variations are limited. These laws generally apply to
employer-sponsored health insurance plans covering
2-50 workers.
I address two main questions. First, have portability
refonlls aimed to facilitate job transitions and reduce
job lock increased job mobility? Second, by limiting
the use of health status in premium setting, have rating
rcfonns increased the proportion of individuals with
adverse health characteristics in insured small finns,
and thereby reduced employment distortion in small
firms? I develop a simple theoretical model which
shows that contrary to common belief, portability
refonns have an ambiguous cffect on job mobility.
Another interesting theoretical implication, possibly
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unforeseen by policy makers, is that while rating
reforms reduce small-firm health insurance costs for the
sick, and thcreby increase small-firm hiring of the sick,
rating reforms increase health insurance costs for older
individuals and therefore reduce small-firm hiring for
the old. This is due to the fact that age is positively
correlated with sickness, and rating reforms restrict the
use of sickness in setting premiums, resulting in greater
weight on age in premium setting.
The empirical analysis uses March Current
Population Survey data from 1991-1997. My results
suggest that rating rcforms increase relative job
mobility and small-firm employment opportunities of
individuals who have disabled family members.
Therefore, by reducing the cost of health insurance for
sick individuals in small firms, rating refonns may
reduce employment distortions due to the small-group
health insurance market. On the other hand, rating
reforms result in the setting of premiums on the basis of
demographic factors such as age that are highly
correlated with health status, hence these reforms
decrease small-finn employment opportunities for
older individuals. Therefore, rating refonns must be
judged, at least partly, on the basis of whether this
redistlibution of health insurance costs from the sick to
the old enhances welfarc.
The impact of portability reform, which was
introduced to reduce job lock, is somewhat mixed.
Portability increases job mobility for insurance holders,
suggesting that it reduces job lock. However,
portability unaccompanied by rating reform reduces the
proportion of insured small-firm new hires with family
disabilities. This suggests that by increasing the cost of
health insurance, portability may have a negative
impact on individuals who have adverse health
characteristics. By implementing both portability and
rating laws at the same time, most states have balanced
the negative effects of portability on individuals with
adverse health characte11stics with the positive effects
of the rating laws. The impact of the small group
p0l1abilityreform serves as an important indicator of
the expected effect of Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HlPAA) that was signed into law in
August 1996. This federal legislation mandates
portability without any accompanying restriction on
premium rating. The experience from the small-group
health insurance reform suggests that HIPPA may have
a negative impact on the employment opportunities of
individuals with adverse health characteristics.
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